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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 784-4-103.
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
I. Issues Raised in Plaintiff's Appeal
Douglas Knight Construction, Inc. ("DKC) agrees that Plaintiff has accurately
framed Issues 1 through 3 and correctly stated the standards of review for these issues'
However, Issue Number 4 should be framed as follows:
'Whether the District Court erred when it ruled on sumlnary judgment that Plaintiff
had no viable contract claims against DKC because the claims Plaintiff obtained on
assignment from Outpost were defective as Plaintiff failed to prove that Outpost suffered
damages prior to filing for bankruptcy. This is a question of law reviewed for correctness
with no deference to the trial court. Cabaness v.T'homas,2070UT 23,\18,232P.3d
486; Meadow Valley Contractors., Inc. v. utah Department of Transportation, 2011 UT
35, q[63, 266P.3d67r.1
I Plaintiff's Second Antended Notice of Appeal (R. 6331-32) notes that Plaintiff is also
appealing (l) the District Court's December 2,2073 Order on IDKC's] Third Motion to
Disltiss antl/or Motion.for Judgment on the Pleatlings, which dismissed Plaintiff's causes
of action for fraud and fraudulent nondisclosure; and (2) the District Court's August 1 1,
2015 Order Denying Plaintiff's Rule 59 Motion to Alter or Antend Judgment. Neither of
these rulings are addressed in Plaintiff's brief and the District Court should therefore be
summarily affirmed on these rulings. See Brown v. Glover,2000 UT 89,1123,16 P.3d
540 (noting that issues not raised in appellant's opening brief are waived).
I
il. Issues Raised in DKC's Cross-Appeal
Whether the District Court correctly applied Utah's Builders Statute of Repose,
Utah Code section 188-2-225, and determined that Plaintiff's home was completed on
March l7 ,2006, despite the fact that Summit County did not issue a Certificate of
Occupancy for Plaintiff's home until May ll ,2006. This is a question of law reviewed
for correctness. Menzies v. state,2014uT 40,11344.3d 581.
Whether there are genuine issues of material fact regarding the date that Plaintiff's
home was completed for purposes of applying the Builders Statute of Repose. "In
determining whether the trial court correctly found that there was no genuine issue of
material fact, [Utah courts] accept the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party." SME Industries, Inc. v. Thompson, Ventulett, Stainback and
Assocs., Inc.,200l UT 54, 119,28P.3d669.
Both of these issues are preserved in DKC's Memoranda filed in opposition to
Third-Party Defenda nl"s' M ct ti ons fo r S ttmm ary J tul g me nt.2
DETERMINATIVB LAW
Utah Code Ann. $ 188-2-225 (2009)
Utah Code Ann. $ 58-56-4 (2004)
Utah Admin. Code R. 156-56-701 (2004)
2003 International Building Code $ 1 10.1
These authorities are set forth verbatim in Addendum I hereto.
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'? R. 3 172-200 and 427 6-303.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is a construction defect case involving Plaintiff/Appellant Joe Tomlinson's
home in Park City, Utah (the "Home"). On or about March 17 ,2006, Plaintiff purchased
the Home from a developer, Outpost Development, Inc. ("Outpost").
Defendant/Appellee Douglas Knight Construction ("DKC") was the general contractor
that built the Home for Outpost,3 and DKC hired numerous subcontractors to complete
the work. A Certificate of Occupancy was issued for the Home on May 11,2006.
Disposition at Trial Court
I. Plaintiff's Claims Against DKC
Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint alleged numerous claims against DKC. On
November 25,2013, the District Court dismissed Plaintiff's Sixth Cause of Action for
breach of implied warranties.o On December 2,2073, the District Court dismissed
Plaintiff's Seventh Cause of Action for fraud and Eighth Cause of Action for fraudulent
non-disclosure because those claims were barred by Utah's Builders Statute of Repose,
Utah Code section 788-2-225.s
Plaintiff's First and Fifth Causes of Action brought contract claims against DKC
based on a purported assignment of claims from Outpost to Plaintiff. On June 3,2015,
'The Construction Agreement between DKC and Outpost is attached hereto as
Addendum 2
o R. 2535-40.
sR.2541-52.
3
the District Court granted DKC summary judgment on these claims.6 Pursuant to Utah
Rule of Civil Procedure 59, Plaintiff moved for amendment of the District Coutl's June 3,
2015 Order. On August 11,2015,the District Court denied Plaintiff's Rule 59 Motion.T
DKC also moved for summary judgment on Plaintiff's contract claims based on
the waiver provisions in the Construction Agreement between DKC and Outpost. On
January 29,2015,8 the District Court granted DKC partial summary judgment, but later
declared this Motion moot when the Court dismissed Plaintiff's contract claims.e
il. DKC's Third-Party Claims Against the Subcontractors
DKC's Third-Antended Complaint alleged that, to the extent Plaintiff proves
consrruction defects at the Home, the liability for those defects lies with DKC's
subcontractors.l0 Cross-Appellees Superior Insulation Co.; Akita Construction, Inc.; and
Picture Perfect Stone Masonry (collectively, the "Subcontractors") moved for summary
judgment based on the Builders Statute of Repose. In Orders dated August 26,2014, and
January 2,2015, the District Court granted the Subcontractors summary judgment and
determined that the Home was completed on March 17 ,2006, when Plaintiff offered to
purchase the Home from Outpost. The Court determined that Outpost was able to "use or
possess" the Home on March 1J ,2006, based on testimony that the Home was staged and
furnished at the time Plaintiff offered to purchase the Home. Because DKC did not file
u R. 6081-85, June 3,2015 Orcler, which is attached hereto as Addendum 3.
'p,.6zg3-84.
* R. 5480-84, January 29,2015 Orcler, which is attached hereto as Addendum 4.
e Addendum 3, June 3,2015 Order.
"'R. 879-90.
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its Third-Party Complaint until April 30, 2012, the Court determined that DKC's claims
were time barred.ll
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
The Construction Agreement
1 . On July 21,2004, DKC entered into a contract ("Construction Agreement")
with Lot 84 Deer Crossing, LLC to construct the Home.l2
2. Lot 84 Deer Crossing then purportedly assigned its rights in the Home and
the Construction Agreement to Outpost.l3
3, The Construction Agreement defines the term "substantial completion" as
the time "when construction is sufficiently complete so that [Outpost] can occupy or
utilize the Project for the purpose for which it intended. [Outpost] may take possession
of the Project after Substantial Completion at a time agreed to by the parties."la
4. The Construction Agreement provides that "[t]he making of final payment
and completion of corrected work referenced in Article l3 shall constitute a waiver of all
claims by [Outpost] with the exception of claims in Article 9."rs
5. Article 9.1 of the Construction Agreement provides DKC's limited
warranty:
" The August 26,2014, and January 2,2015 Orders are attached hereto as Addendum 5.
'' R. 817, Third Amended Complaint,\7; Addendum2, Construction Agreement.
'' R. 817, Third Amended Complaint,\8.la Addendum2,\2.3.
r5 Addendum2,ïÍ6.4.
5
Contractor agrees to extend all manufacturer warranties to
Owner. Contractor does not waffant or in any way guarantee
the useful life of any product used in the construction of the
Project, if the product is a natural product, including but not
limited to logs, timbers, stones, or rocks. . . . Contractor
further warrants the Work as per Utah state code for a
period of one year.'6
6. The Construction Agreement's limitation on liability clause states:
In no event shall Contractor be liable for special or
consequential damages. Contractor's liability on any claim
by [Outpost] arising out of or connected with this
contract, or any obligation resulting therefrom, or from
the manufacture, sale, delivery, installation or use of any
materials covered by this agreement shall be limited to
that which is set forlh in lArticle 9.7].t'
1 . Article l3.l of the Construction Contract sets forth the Correction of Work
provisions, which state: "The Owner or Owner's architect shall furnish to the Contractor,
at the time of Substantial Completion, a written list of any work that is incomplete,
rejected or claimed to be defective, or failing to conform to the Agreement. Otherwise,
any such rejection or claim is waived."ls
L In other words, Outpost's acceptance of the work and final payment
resulted in a waiver of all claims under the Construction Agreement except: (1) claims for
breach of warranty under Article 9, and (2) claims for incorrect work under Article 13.re
16 Addendum2,\9.'7.
r7 Addendum 2, j[9.8.
r8 Addendum2,!l13.l.
re Addendu m 2, lÍ 6.4, 9.7, 9.8
6
The Sale of the Home and Issuance of a Certificate of Occupancy
g. On March lJ ,2006, Plaintiff offered to purchase the Home.20
10. The Real Estate Purchase Contract was executed on April 7 ,2006, and the
settlement deadline for Plaintiff's purchase was May 15,2006.21
1 1. On May 7J,2006, Summit County issued a Certificate of Occupancy for
the Property.22
12. As such, pursuant to the Construction Agreement, substantial completion
was achieved no later than }y'ray 17 ,2006.23
13. Plaintiff did not move into the Home until June of 2006.24
The Initial Leak and DKC's Efforts to Repair the Home
14. Prior to Plaintiff's purchase of the Home, a water leak developed, which
Ourpost disclosed to Plaintiff (the "Initial Leak"). Pursuant to Article l3 of the
Construction Agreement, DKC attempted to repair this leak.25
15. Despite DKC's efforts to repair the Initial Leak, in October of 2006
Plaintiff discovered water damage in the Home.26
16. DKC again attempted to repair the Initial Leak. This work included repair
work on the exterior fireplace near the great room, the northwest sliding glass doors to
t0 R. 81 8, Thirtl Amended Complaint, 1[ ] 9.
" R.3205-3214, Real Estate Purchase Contract, ll24(Ð
" R.3238, Certificate of Occupancy.
23 Addendum2,\2.3.
'o R.3216-3217, Joe Tomlinson Depo., p.4I 11-20.
's R. 81 8-I9, Third Amenderl Complaint, q[ 18, 20,22.
'6 R. 8 19, Thircl Amenclecl Complaint,ll2{.
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the great room, and interior repairs in the northwest bedroom and its closet, which are
directly below the great room and exterior fiteplace'27
17. DKC continued to repair the home, and sent an email to Plaintiff outlining
the proposed scope of repair work.28
18. On or about }day 7,2001, Plaintiff advised Outpost that he no longer
wanted DKC to work on the Home, and that he would be hiring his own repair
contractor.2e Plaintiff confirmed in his deposition that as of this date he had decided to
hire his own repair contractor.30
The Alleged Construction Defects
lg. Plaintiff hired Dan Kopsack of Park City Fine Homes to perform repair
work on the Home.3l
20. On July 2,200J,Mr. Kopsack commenced his work on the Home.32
21. Mr. Kopsack testified that he never spoke with anyone from DKC or any of
DKC's subcontractors.33 In other words, DKC received no notice of any construction
defects at the Project discovered by Park City Fine Homes'
22. Park City Fine Homes allegedly discovered additional construction defects
at the Property.3a
2' R.4185-90, Doug Knight Depo., p.122:16-126:21.tt R. 4195.
'e R.4rg7.
'o R. 4199-4201, Joe Tomlinson Depo., p.71:77-72:103' R. 820, Third Amended Complaint,[132.
3' R. 4221 -4222 D an Kopsack Depo., p. 146:1 4-1 47 :2.
" R.4220,Dan Kopsack Depo., p.59:18-25.
8
DKC's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment re: Waiver
23. DKC moved for partial summary judgment on the grounds that all alleged
defects not related to the Initial Leak were waived by the Construction Agreement
because those defects were not disclosed to DKC during the one year warranty period.35
24. On January 29,2015, the trial court entered an Order re: IDKC's]Motion
for Sumntary Judgment re: Waiver,which granted DKC's Motion,in part.36
25. The Court concluded that under the unambiguous terms of the Construction
Agreement "any claims for contractual defects or construction defects not raised with the
contractor DKC within one year of substantial completion are indeed waived."37
26. The parties then submitted supplemental briefing concerning which defects
had been waived, but the District Court subsequently declare d,the Motion moot.38
Outpost Development's BankruPtcY
27 . Outpost filed for Chapter 7 Bankruptcy on September 13,2011.3e
28. In its bankruptcy, Outpost listed Plaintiff on its Schedule F of
unsecured creditors to be discharged.a"
29. Outpost listed on its Schedule B of assets, its "contingent claim"
'o R. 820, Thirct Amended Complaint, g[ 33.
" R. 4131, DKC's Memorandrmt ín Support of Motionfor Partial Sunrmary Judgment re:
Waiver.
36 Addendum 4, January 29,2015 Order.
37 Addendum 4,p.4.
38 Addendum 3, June 3,2015 Order.
" R. 5293, Plaintiff's Response to Request for Admission No. 5.
40 R.5306-07.
9
against DKC for Outpost's potential liability to Plaintiff with respect to construction
of the Home.al
30. On December 2,2011, the Bankruptcy Trustee filed a Motion with
the Bankruptcy Court for the sale and assignment of Outpost's "Causes of Action"
against DKC to Plaintift.a2
31. In that Motion, the Trustee represented to the Bankruptcy Court that
Outpost's Causes of Action consisted of "indemnity or contribution" from DKC in the
event Outpost was found liable to Plaintiff.a3
32. Outpost's cross claims against DKC are contingent upon Outpost being
found liable to Plaintiff. Outpost's breach of contract claim against DKC states: "To the
extent the allegations made in Plaintffi' Amended Complaint or any other pleading
against Outpost are trLte, which Outpost denies, then DKC has failed to provide services,
good, materials and/or performance promised in accordance with its contractual
obligations and has breached the Construction Agreement."44
33. On February 21,2072, the Bankruptcy Court granted the Trustee's
Motion.as
*' R. 5309-12.
o'F..5314.
o3 R. 53 14, p.2.
oo R.213, Outpost Cross-Claim,\19 (emphasis added)
ot R. 5316.
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34. The Assignment of Claims executed between the Bankruptcy Estate of
Outpost and Plaintiff, dated January 23, 2012, shows that Plaintiff paid Five Thousand
Dollars ($5,000.00) for this Assignment.a6
35. Based on this Assignment, Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint asserts
claims for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing
against DKC.47
36. On January 23,2013, the Bankruptcy Trustee filed his Final Report,
effectively terminating the bankruptcy proceedings and discharging Outpost's creditors,
including Plaintiff.a8
DKC'S Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's Assigned Claims
31. DKC moved for summary judgment on Plaintiff's First Cause of Action for
breach of the Construction Agreement and Fifth Cause of Action for of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.ae
38. On June 3,2015,the District Court granted DKC's Motion.so
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I. Plaintiff's Appeal
First, the District Court's dismissal of Plaintiff's assigned contract claims should
be affirmed because the District Court correctly determined that Plaintiff failed to show
o6 R. 5318-19.
ot R. 816, Thírd Amended Complaint,\48-54 and 74-80tt R. 532r-28.
un R. 5259.
s(' Addendum 3, June 3,2015 Order, p. 4.
1l
that assignor Outpost suffered damages. Indeed, an assignee not otherwise in privity of
contract with an obligor can only recover damages its assignor suffered for claims its
assignor could have asserted against the obligor. The undisputed facts show that Outpost
filed for bankruptcy before being found liable for any damages, so Plaintiff's contract
claims fail.
Second, even if Plaintiff's contract claims survive, the District Court correctly
granted partial summary judgment on construction defects that Plaintiff waived by failing
to raise them during the one year warranty period. The Construction Agreement between
DKC and Outpost states that Outpost's acceptance of the work and final payment resulted
in a waiver of all claims under the Construction Agreement except: (1) claims for breach
of warranty, which had to be raised within one year of substantial completion, and (2)
claims for incorect work, which had to be reported at the time of Substantial
Completion.
Third, this Court should affirm dismissal of Plaintiff's claim for breach of implied
warranty because DKC is not in privity of contract with Plaintiff and therefore owed no
such warranties to Plaintiff. Moreover, this Court cannot extend Davencot'trr's implied
warranties to DKC because Utah Code section 788-4-513 requires privity of contract for
construction defect claims.
12
II. DKC's Cross Appeal
The District Court should be reversed because its interpretation of the Statute of
Repose conflicts with Utah law. Under the International Building Code, which has been
adopted as Utah's Building Code, the Home could not be occupied or used until Summit
County issued a Certificate of Occupancy. As such, the Property was completed, and the
Statute of Repose began running, no earlier than May 17 ,2006, when Summit County
issued the Certificate of Occupancy. Such an interpretation is further consistent with the
Construction Agreement, which defined substantial completion as occurring when the
Owner was permitted to occupy the residence. DKC's April 30,2012 Third-Party
Complaint is therefore timely against the Subcontractors. Alternatively, the District
Court should be reversed because determining the date of the first use or possession of
the Home is a fact-intensive issue that cannot be decided on summary judgment. Finally,
DKC's claims for indemnity and contribution survive summary judgment because those
claims are subject to a separate statute of repose, which began running upon the date
DKC discovered these claims. Because DKC filed its Third-Party Complaint within two
years of Plaintiff commencing this action, DKC's indemnity and contribution claims are
timely.
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ARGUMENT
I. PLAINTIFF'S APPEAL
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED PLAINTIFF'S
ASSIGNED CONTRACT CLAIMS BECAUSE PLAINTIFF FAILED
TO SHOW THAT THAT THE ASSIGNOR SUFFERED
DAMAGES.5l
On June 3,2015, the District Court granted DKC summary judgment on Plaintiff's
assigned contract claims. That Court stated that "Plaintiff is in the shoes of Outpost, and
because Outpost has not, and cannot, suffer damages, Plaintiff's claims fail as a matter of
law."52 The District Court explained that "Plaintiff's claims in this case-for
construction defects against DKC-are entirely dependent upon Outpost first being found
liable to Plaintiff for damages before Outpost would have an actionable "pass through"
claim against DKC."s3 Plaintiff asserts that the District Court improperly dismissed his
claim for breach of warranty by erroneously limiting Plaintiff's damages to those actually
suffered by Outpost prior to its assignment of claims. Plaintiff argues that under
Sunridge Development Corp. v. RB&G, Engineering,Inc.,2010 UT 6,230 P.3d 1000, he
has the right to assert any claim that Outpost could have pursued, not merely the claims
that Outpost did pursue. But either way Plaintiff's claims fail as a matter of law.
5' DKC has addressed the District Court's June 3, 2015 Ruling first because if this Court
affirms the dismissal of Plaintiff's contract claims Plaintiff's appeal of the District
Court's January 29,2015 Ruling on waiver of claims becomes moot.
52 Addendum 3, June 3,2015 Order, p. 4.
s3 Addendum 3, June 3,2015 Order, p. 4.
A
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PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS AGAINST OUTPOST WERE
DISCHARGED IN BANKRUPTCY.
Because Plaintiff's claims against Outpost were discharged in Outpost's
bankruptcy, Outpost suffered no damages and its pass-through claims against DKC fail.
The general rule is that a discharge from bankruptcy results in the debtor being
discharged from "all debts that arose before the date of the order for relief." S¿¿ 11 USC
ç 721(b). Pursuant to Section 52a@)Q) of the Bankruptcy Code, a discharge operates as
an injunction against the commencement or continuation of
an action, the employment of process, or an act, to collect,
recover or offset any such debt as a personal liability of the
debtor, whether or not discharge of such debt is waived;
11 u.s.c. Ë s2a@)Q).
Consequently, Plaintiff is enjoined from continuing any action or process seeking
to hold Outpost liable on the discharged claim. See Landsing Diversified Properties-Il v.
First Nat'L Bank & Trust Co. (In re Western Real Estate Fund, Inc.,),922F.2d 592, 598
(lQth Cir. 1990). The bankruptcy discharge and the concomitant injunction against
subsequent actions are designed to give the debtor a "financial fresh start." In re .Iet
Florida Systems, |nc.,883F.2d970,912 (llth Cir. 1989).
'Where claims against an indemnitee have been foreclosed as a result of a
bankruptcy discharge, the indemnitee's claims against would be indemnitors have
similarly been discharged by implication. Indeed, "a cause of action for indemnity does
not arise until the liability of the party seeking indemnity results in his damage, either
1
t5
through payment of a sum clearly owed or through the injured party's obtaining an
enforceable judgment." Perry v. Píoneer Wholesale Supply Co.,68l P.2d214,218 (Utah
1984); see also Perno v. For-Med Medical Group, PC,613 N.Y.S. 2d849 851-52 (N'Y.
1998) (noting that an indemnification claim does not arise until the party seeking
indemnity suffer an out-of-pocket loss and that "a party that has not and will not sustain
any actual out of pocket loss as the result of a claim raised against it has no
indemnification claim against a third party").
2. PLAINTIFF OBTAINED ONLY PASS THROUGH CLAIMS
FROM OUTPOST, WHICH ARE UNVIABLE.
The claims that the bankruptcy court allowed the trustee to assign were merely
"pass through" claims. The Bankruptcy Trustee's Motion to SeIl Property of the Estate
specifically characterized Outpost's claims against DKC as seeking "indemnity or
contribution from [DKCI in the event [Outpost] is found liable to [Plaintiffl. The
Trustee's Motion stated that Plaintiff "wish[ed] to purchase any and all of [Outpost's]
Causes of Action in the Utah Litigation against [DKC]." The phrase "Causes of Action"
is expressly defined in the Trustee's Motion to include Outpost's cross claims against
DKC.54 In short, the Trustee sought authority to transfer Outpost's cross claims, and that
is all the Bankruptcy Court authorized in tts Order.
Outpost's cross claims against DKC are based entirely upon Outpost being found
liable to Plaintiff. For example, Outpost's breach of contract claim against DKC states:
'o R. 5314, Bankruptcy Trustee's Motion to SeIl Property of the Estate
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"To the extent the allegations made in Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint or any other
pleading against Outpost are true, which Outpost denies, then DKC has failed to provide
services, good, materials and/or performance promised in accordance with its contractual
obligations and has breached the Construction Agreement."55 All of Outpost's cross-
claims contain similar language, which is why the Bankruptcy Trustee categotized the
claims as indemnity and contribution claims. Outpost's cross-claims are now defective
against DKC because Outpost has not been found liable to Plaintiff. Thus, summary
judgment for DKC was proper.
3. THE TERMS OF THE ASSIGNMENT REQUIRE PLAINTIFF
TO STEP INTO THE SHOES OF OUTPOST.
The District Court's ruling relied on SME v. Thompson, Ventulett, Stainback &
Associates, lnc.,2001 UT 54,28 P.3d 669, which held that an "assignee cannot recover
more than the assignor could recover; and the assignee never stands in a better position
than the assignor." Id., l[ 16. SME further stated than an assignee may not recover the
damages ir suffered as a result of a breach of the assigned contract. Rather the assignee's
recovery, if any, is limited to those damages the assignor suffered as a result of the
breach. I(t.,1[30.s6
Plaintiff correctly notes that Sunridg¿ clarified that the rulings in SME did not
place a "temporal restriction" on the damages an assignee may recover and directed
5s R. 213, Outpost Cross-Claim,[119.
56 Plaintiff's counsel conceded to the District Court that this is a correct statement of the
law. R. 6279 p:26:19-27:1.
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courts to evaluate an assignee's rights under the contract at issue. 2010 UT 6,ï123 &.25.
However, Sunridge is factually distinguishable from the present case and SME should
control this matter. First and foremost, Sunridg¿ involved the assignment of all rights
and obligations under a contract, whereas SME and the present case involve only an
assignment of claims . Itl.,\22. In Sunridge, plaintiff Sunridge Development
Corporation ("SDC") contracted with defendant RB&G Engineering for geotechnical
engineering services for a real estate development. SDC's owner then formed a new
entity, plaintiff Sunridge Enterprises, and transferred all of SDC's rights and clairns under
its contract with RB&G to Sunridge Enterprises. Id., ttgl 2-3.
In SME, on the other hand, only a claim for damages was assigned. Plaintiff SME
was a subcontractor for a renovation project on the Salt Palace Convention Center. SME
made a claim for cost ovefruns against the general contractor, who then forwarded the
claim to Salt Lake County, the owner of the project. Salt Lake County settled with the
general contractor, which settlement included an assignment of the County's claims
against the project designers. The general contractor then settled with SME and assigned
the County's claims against the designers to SME. 2001 UT 54,11\2-6'
The distinction between an assignment of claims versus an assignment of all rights
and privileges under a contract was highlighted by the Suprerne Court in Sunridge. 2OI0
UT 6, \22. Indeed, assignrnent of a claim is a much more limited right than a full
assignment of a contract, and an assignee's rights should be limited accordingly. DKC's
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interpretation of SME is consistent with Justice Durham's concurring opinion in Meadow
Valley Contractors., Inc. v. Utah Department of Transportation,20ll UT 35,266P.3d
671 (Durhafl, J., concurring). Meadow Valley also involved an assignment of claims-
not an assignment of contract-and Justice Durharn opined that it would be plain error to
allow an assignee to recover its own damages while standing in the shoes of an assignor.
Justice Durham relied on SME, and reiterated that "an assignee not otherwise in privity of
contract with an obligor is constrained to pursuing damages its øssl6nor sufferedfot
claims its assignor could have asserted against" the obligor." Meadow VaIIey,20l 1 UT
35, 5[ 81. The majority opinion in Meadow Valley confirmed that Justice Durham
correctly applied SME. Id.,\ 19, n.12.
These authorities warrant affirmation of the District Court. The undisputed facts
demonstrate that Outpost filed for bankruptcy and Plaintiff has not proven that Outpost
suffered any damages.sT Rather than standing in Outpost's shoes, Plaintiff is seeking his
own damages, which is specifically precluded by the Utah Supreme Court.ss
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY INTERPRETED THE
CONSTRUCTION AGREEMENT AND DETERMINED THAT
PLAINTIFF HAD WAIVBD UNTIMELY CLAIMS.
In the event this Court reverses the District Court and allows Plaintiff to proceed
with his assigned contract claims, this Court should affirm the District Couft's ruling that
t' Sæ Statement of Relevant Facts 27 -3'l , sLtpra.
58 Alternatively, Plaintiff has provided no evidence detailing the terms of the assignment
from Lot 84 to Outpost. This lack of evidence provides additional grounds for this Court
to affirm dismissal of Plaintiff's assigned claims because Plaintiff has not shown that Lot
84 suffered any damages.
B.
19
Plaintiff waived claims that were not raised during the one year warranty period. In its
January 29,2015 Order, the District Court ruled that the Construction Agreement is
unambiguous and that "any claims for contractual defects or construction defects not
raised with the contractor DKC within one year of substantial cornpletion are indeed
waived."5e Plaintiff alleges that the District Court erred by inferring a discovery and
notice requirement into the Construction Agreement. As noted by the District Court,
however, a discovery and notice requirement is implicit in the Construction Agreement
because a general contractor cannot make repairs unless advised of the problem.60
The Construction Agreement between DKC and Outpost states that Outpost's
acceptance of the work and final payment resulted in a waiver of all claims under the
Construction Agreement except: (l) claims for breach of warranty, and (2) claims for
incorrect work under the Contract's Correction of Work provision.
"The underlying purpose in construing or interpreting a contract is to asceftain the
intentions of the parties to the contract. In interpreting a contract, the intentions of the
parties are controlling." WebBankv. Am. Gen. Annuity Serv. Corp.,2002UT 88, g[ 17, 54
P.3d 1 739. "lf the language within the four corners of the contract is unambiguous, the
parties' intentions are determined from the plain meaning of the contractual language,
and the contract may be interpreted as a matter of law." Id.,ï119. Additionally, "[t]he
legal standard necessary to find waiver is clear: Waiver is the intentional relinquishment
5e Addendum 4, January 29,2015 Order
ou R. 6281 p.56:23-57:5.
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of a known right. To constitute waiver, there must be an existing right, benefit or
advantage, a knowledge of its existence, and an intention to relinquish it." U.S. Real\, 86
Assocs. v. Sec. Inv., Ltd.,2002UT 14,l[16,40 P.3d 586.
Here, the Construction Agreement provides that "[t]he making of final payment
and completion of corrected work referenced in Article 13 shall constitute a waiver of
all claims by the Owner with the exception of claims in Article 9."6r Article 13 of the
Construction Agreement unambiguously required Outpost to "furnish to [DKC], at the
time of Substantial Completion, a written list of any work that is incomplete, rejected or
claimed to be defective, or failing to conform to the Agreement. Otherwise, any such
rejection or claim is waived."62 Article 9 provides:
9.7 Limited Warranty: Contractor agrees to extend all
manufacturer warranties to Owner. Contractor does not
warrant or in any way guarantee the useful life of any product
used in the construction of the Project, if the product is a
natural product, including but not limited to logs, timbers,
stones, or rocks. . . . Contractor further warrants the
Work as per Utah state code for a period of one year.
9.8 In no event shall Contractor be liable for special or
consequential damages. Contractor's liability on any claim
by Owner arising out of or connected with this contract,
or any obligation resulting therefrom, or from the
manufacture, sale, delivery, installation or use of any
materials covered by this agreement shall be limited to
that which is set forin in thã preceding paragraph.63
ó' Addendum2,ll 6.4 (emphasis added).
62 Addendum 2, t[ 13.1.
ó3 Addendum2,\.9.7 &.9.8 (ernphasis added).
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The Construction Agreement unambiguously requires the owner or architect to
provide DKC with notice of any incomplete or defective work and further states that
claims for incorrect work that are not disclosed to DKC are expressly waived.
Additionally, under the Construction Agreement, DKC warranted the work for one year
from substantial completion, which means that the waffanty period expired no later than
lilay 17 ,2001 , or one year after the Certificate of Occupancy was issued. In sum, the
Construction Agreement contains a broad limitation of liability in paragraph 9.8, which
bars all claims under the contract except the limited warranty set forth in patagtaph 9.7
and claims for incorrect work under paragraph 13. As such, the District Court property
determined that all defects raised outside of the waffanty period and therefore waived
under Articles 9 and 13.
This Court applied similar reasoning in Beckstead v. Deseret Roofing Company,
Inc., 831P.2d 130, (Utah Ct. App. 1992). In that case, a homeowner sued a roofing
contractor for breach of a warranty in which the contractor wananted that the roof would
be watertight for a period of two years. Leaks first manifested within the warranty
period, but because suit was not brought until after the warranty period had expired, it
was argued that no further work was required under the contract. Id. Citing to an
analogous decision, the Utah Court of Appeals recognized that the warranty does not set
a limitation on repairs, but rather a maximum period for the "discovery and proper
notification regarding defect." Id. The Court concluded that the contractor breached the
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warranty because the defect manifested itself during the warranty period and the
contractor never fixed the leak. Id. at I32. In other words, Utah courts also recognize
that claims for breach of waranty must be based upon construction defects that manifest
themselves and are properly reported during the warranty period'
Another analogous case is MountainView v. Casper Concrete Company,9l2P.2d
529 (V/yo. 1996). There, the construction contract contained a one year walranty, as well
as a provision stating that all claims would be waived once the final payment was made'
Icl. af 531. The Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the case because the
plaintiff waived its claims by making the final payment and because the claims were
brought after the one year warranty period had lapsed. Id. at 533. See also Cree
Coaches, Inc. v. Panel Suppliers, Inc.,186 N.W. 2d335 (Mich. I97l) (disrnissing claims
as waived because parties specifically limited the liability of defendant for faulty work
appearing within one year from the date of completion of the contract). Thus,
Beckstea¿l's requirement that discovery and notification occur within the warranty period,
but permitting a lawsuit to be filed thereafter is facially reasonable and in line with other
jurisdictions.
The authority cited by Plaintiff is not inconsistent with DKC's proffered
interpretation of the Construction Agreement. In Northeastern Power Co. v. Balcke-
Durr, Inc., 7999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13431, *ll-1S (8.D. Pa, August 20, 1999), the Court
determined that a reasonable interpretation of the warranty would allow for coverage of
23
manifest, but undiscovered, defects due to the fault of the seller. Similar to the warranty
at issue in this case, the lack of language expressly requiring a defect to be "found or
discovered" during the warranty period did not obviate a requirement that the purported
defect manifest itself in some manner. Id. ln the product liability context, many courts
evaluating one year warranty periods require the defect to be "perceived" or capable of
perception by a reasonable user performing a normal inspection. See Canal Electric Co.
v. Westinghouse Electric Co.,973 F.2d 988, 992 (lstCir. 1992) (determining that alleged
product defect was not actionable because it was not discovered during the warranty
period). Plaintiff's attempt to expand DKC's \À/affanty to cover defects that do not
manifest during the one year wananty period renders the warranty term entirely
superfluous by replacing a warranty of determinate duration with an indefinite warranty
term
Plaintiff also argues that the policies discussed in Davenco¿,r/ support the notion
that the warranty should be construed against DKC and in his favor. Plaintiff failed to
preserve this argument below,6a so it should not be addressed here. Holladay v. Slorey,
2013 UT App 158, 1[9,307 P.3d 584 (declining to address issue not raised in the trial
court). Moreover, the language cited by Plaintiff actually relates to a claim for breach of
implied \À/arranty. As shown in the next section, it is undisputed that DKC owed no such
warranty to Plaintiff and Plaintiff's remedy for latent defects was against Outpost as the
uo SrrR.4720-34, Plaintiff's Opposition to DKC's Motionfor Summary Judgement re
Waiver;R. 628 l, Hearing Transcript.
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seller of the Property. See Dctvencottrt at Pilgrims Landing Honteowners Assn. v'
Davencourt at Pilgrims Landing, LC,2009 UT 65, 1160,221P.3d234.
The foregoing demonstrate that defects not raised by Plaintiff during the one year
waffanty period are waived under Articles 9 and 13 of the Construction Agreement
because these alleged defects were discovered after expiration of the waranty period.
The District Court's January 29,2075 Order should therefore be affirmed.
C. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED PLAINTIFF'S
IMPLIED \ryARRANTY CLAIM.
The District Court properly dismissed Plaintifï's Sixth Cause of Action for
implied warranties because DKC is not in privity of contract with Plaintiff. In
Davencourt,2009 UT 65, 9[ 60, the Utah Suprerne Court held that a plaintiff homeowner
may bring a claim for breach of the implied warranty of construction in a workmanlike
manner and breach of the implied warranty of habitability. However, such a claim for
breach of implied warranties must be based on privity of contract in the form of an
agreement between a vendor and vendee. Indeed, Davencourl enumerates the elements
for a breach of implied warranty claim to require "the purchase of any new residence
from a defendant builder-vendor/developer-vendor." Icl.
The District Court correctly concluded that DKC is neither a builder-vender nor a
developer-vender. As such, this Court should follow the principal of vertical stare decisis
and affirm the District Court's November 25,2013 Order. Mitchell v. Labor Cotn'n,
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2015 UT App 94, g[ 10, 348 P.3d 356 (noting that Utah Court of Appeals "must follow
strictly the decisions rendered by the Utah Supreme Court").
Perhaps most importantly, Plaintiff's argument that the implied warranty should
be extended to builders contradicts the Utah legislature's unambiguous directive that a
cause of action for defective construction must be based on privity of contract. Utah
Code section 788-4-513 states that "an action for defective design or construction may be
brought only by a person in privity of contract with the original contractor, architect,
engineer, or the real estate developer." As aptly stated by the Utah Supreme Court:
We are relegated to the function of agent of the legislature 
-
of interpreting the policy judgment that it reached, and not of
imposing our own will through the exercise of our limited
judicial power...
Because we conclude that our legislature has spoken on this
issue, we defer to its judgment and enforce its decision as we
understand it. And we do so not based on any abstract notion
of purpose or intent but based on the legislature's actual
product 
- 
the statutory text.
Graves v. North Eastern Services, Inc.,2015 UT 28,119170 &.'16,345P.3d61,9
In creating the claim for breach of implied warranty, the Utah Supreme Court specifically
recognized that the claim must be based on privity of contract in accordance with Utah
Code section 788-4-513. Davencourt,2009 UT 65,1157 , n. 13. As such, this Court
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should decline Plaintiff's invitation to ignore the plain language of Utah's legislative
scheme by expanding the implied warranty to include those not in privity of contract.65
Finally, Plaintiff raises numerous policy arguments in favor of extending
Davencourr's implied warranties to builders. Plaintiff's brief, however, relies on broad
generalizations as opposed to factual evidence supporting his policy arguments. These
policy arguments are unpersuasive and the District Court should be affirmed.
II. DKC'S CROSS-APPEAL
A. DKC'S CLAIMS ARE TIMELY BECAUSB UTAH LAW
PROHIBITS THE USE OR OCCUPANCY OF RESIDENTIAL
BUILDINGS UNTIL A CERTIFICATE OF OCCUPANCY IS
ISSUED.
The District Court determined that DKC's Third-Party Complaint was untimely
under the Builders Statute of Repose because the Home was used or possessed by March
lJ,2006, when Plaintiff made an offer to purchase the Home.66 DKC respectfully
submits that the District Court misapplied the Statute of Repose.
The primary issue is whether the repose period began on May IJ ,2006, when
Summit County issued the Certificate of Occupancy or whether the repose period began
upon "the date of first use or possession" of the Home. Utah Code section 188-2-
225(l)(c) defines "completion of improvement" to mean the earliest of
ó'Additionally, to the extent Plaintiff now argues that the "vendor" requirement of
Davencourr should be abandoned, Plaintiff failed to preserve that argument in the District
Court. See, R. 1888-92, Plaintiff's Opposition to DKC's Third Motion to Dismiss, and R.
6280, Hearing Transcript, p. 29 :20-34:2.
66 Addendum 5, August 26,2014, and January 2,2015 Orders.
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(l) a Certificate of Substantial Completion;67
(2) a Certificate of Occupancy issued by a governing agency; or
(3) the date of first use or pos.session of the improvement.68
As will be discussed below, the only manner in which the Subcontractors'
"improvements" to the Home can be considered "complete" is by the issuance of a
Certificate of Occupancy from Summit County, Utah.
Because Summit County issued a building permit in August 2004, this Project was
governed by Utah Code section 58-56-1 et seq., which required the Utah Division of
Occupational Licensing and the Utah Uniform Building Cornmission to adopt
"construction codes which the state and each political subdivision of the state shall
follow[.]" Utah Code Ann. $ 58-56-4(2)(a) (200a).ue This statute further states that these
building codes "shall be followed when new construction is involved." Id. $ 58-56-
a(3Xa). Pursuant to this enabling statute, Utah Administrative Code R156-56-10l(2004)
incorporated by reference and adopted the 2003 of the International Building Code. Utah
Admin. Code R. 156-56-701(lXa) (200Ð.70 The 2003 International Building Code
("IBC") states that "No building or structure shall be used or occupied . . . until the
building official has issued a certificate of occupancy therefore as provided herein'"
67 It is undisputed that a Certificate of Substantial Completion was not issued for this
Project so this subsection is inapplicable.
6t A copy of this statute is attached in Addendum 1.
6e A copy of this statute is attached in Addendum 1'
t" A .opy of this administrative rule is attached in Addendum 1.
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2003 IBC $ I 10.1 (emphasis added).7r In other words, the Home could not be used or
possessed until Summit County issued a Certificate of Occupancy.
Utah courts' "priffiary objective" when interpreting statutes is "to give effect to the
intent of the legislature ." Rapela v. Green, 2012IJT 57 , 1l 19 , 289 P .3d 428. Cotxts look
"first to the statute's plain language and presume that the legislature used each word
advisedly and read each term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning." Id.
Furthermore, courts must construe statutes "such that no part or provision will be
inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant, and so that one section will not destroy
another." fuJ. Here, the term "Certificate of Occupancy" is not defined in the Statute of
Repose, but it has an accepted meaning and legal significance because that term is
defined in the IBC, which the Legislature and the appropriate administrative agencies
have adopted and incorporated into Utah 1aw. As such, the District Court's interpretation
of the Statute of Repose conflicts with the plain language of the statute and renders the
phrase "Certificate of Occupancy" inoperative or superfluous.
Indeed, as a matter of law, the owner of a newly constructed home cannot use or
possess that home until he or she can legally take occupancy, which requires the issuance
of Certificate of Occupancy. Several courts from other jurisdictions have reached this
conclusion. InNolanv. Paramount Home,ç,518 S.E.2d'789,791 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999),
the court determined that the statLlte of limitations began to run when the building
t' A copy of this IBC section is attached in Addendum I
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department issued a "certificate of compliance" because this was when the home was
substantially complete and could be used for its intended purpose as a residence.
Here, the clear intent of this Project was to build a residence that could be
occupied. This is evidenced by the Construction Agreement, which defines "substantial
completion" as the time when the owner can "occupy or utilize the Project for the
purpose for which it is intend ed."72 In other words, Outpost was contractually
prohibited from taking possession of the Home until it could legally occupy the Home.
Just as in Noktn, the purpose of this Project was to build a residence, and the Statute of
Repose should not begin running until the Home could be inhabited.
Applying the proper statutory interpretation to the facts of this case renders
DKC's third-party claims timely. Surnmit County signed the Certificate of Occupancy
on May 17 ,2006.13 Pursuant to the IBC, no one could use or occupy the Home until that
rime. Because DKC filed its Third-Party Complaint on April 20,20L2, DKC brought its
third-party claims prior to the expiration of the six year Statute of Repose.
PUBLIC POLICY DOES NOT FAVOR THE SUBCONTRACTORS'
INTERPRETATION OF THE STATUTB OF REPOSE.
The Subcontractors argued below that commencing the Statute of Repose on
March l7 ,2006, comports with the Utah Legislature's intention to protect contractors
from the "social and economic evils" of remote and unexpected construction defect
72 Addendum 2, Construction Agreement", 1Í 2.3.t'Th" same starutory scheme that applied in20O4 also applied in 2006. SeeUtah Code $
5S-56-4 (2006) and Utah Admin. R. Rl56-56-101 (2006), which incorporate and adopt
the 2003 International Building Code.
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litigation. SeelJtah Code Ann. $ 188-2-225(2). However, the Statute of Repose
expressly protects contractors from remote litigation where the general contractor or
developer have been dilatory in completing construction by rnaking "abandonment of
construction" an event that triggers the repose period after there has been "no design or
construction activity . . . for a continuous period of one year." Utah Code Ann. $ 788-2-
225(2). There is no allegation that construction was abandoned on this Project.
Moreover, the Subcontractors would suffer no hardship, unexpected costs, or
difficulty in defending this matter if the Statute of Repose commenced upon the issuance
of a Certificate of Occupancy. Indeed, the Subcontractors timely answered DKC's Third-
Party Complaint and diligently defended their work throughout the case.Ta Thus, the
Subcontractors have not suffered the social and economic evils contemplated in the
Statute of Repose.
On the other hand, public policy weighs in favor of applying the Certificate of
Occupancy as the event that triggers the Statute of Repose. The issuance of a Certificate
of Occupancy provides a clear demarcation of when a residential home is complete for
purposes of the statute of repose. This provides homeowners and contractors alike with a
line in the sand from which the repose period commences. Conversely, the "use and
possession" subsection of the statute is better suited for improvements that do not require
a Certificate of Occupancy, such as a fence or swimming pool. Additionally, as
'o Sur, R. 1015, Akita Construction's Answ er;R. 1070, Superior Insulation's Answer;R
1081, Picture Perfect Stone Masonry's Attswer.
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discussed below, determining the date of use or possession is a factually intensive inquiry
that will make it challenging for potential litigants to evaluate the repose period.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE
THERE ARE GENUINE ISSUES OF FACT CONCERNING THE
DATE \ryHBN THE OWNER BEGAN TO USE OR POSSESS THE
PROPERTY.
Alternatively, DKC respectfully submits that the District Court should be reversed
because there are factual disputes about the date on which Outpost or Plaintiff began to
use or possess the Home. This would necessarily include the factual inquiry into the date
on which the Home was complete enough to be used for its intended purpose as a
residence. At the summary judgment stage, "all facts and the reasonable inferences to be
made therefrom should be construed in a light favorable to IDKC as] the non-moving
party." USA Power, LLC v. PacifiCorp.,2010 UT 31,1[33, 235P.3d 749. Furthermore,
"[e]ven absent a complete conflict as to certain facts, a dispute of the understanding,
intention, and consequences of those facts may defeat summary judgment." 1d.,1132.
Applying these standards, it is entirely plausible that the Home was not used or possessed
until the issuance of the Certificate of Occupancy, or even when Plaintiff moved into the
home in June of 2006.7s Additionally, the Real Estate Purchase Contract between
Outpost and Plaintiff was not executed until April J ,2006.16 Consequently, the jury
should be permitted to hear the evidence about the status of construction and whether
Outpost was reasonably able to use or possess the Home prior to the issuance of the
1sR.3216-3217, Joe Tomlinson Depo. p.4l: I7-20.
?ó R. 3205-3274, Real Estate Purchase Contract, \,24(Ð
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Certificate of Occupancy. Because this is a highly fact-intensive issue, summary
judgment was inappropriate and the District Court's ruling should be reversed.
D. DKC'S INDEMNITY AND CONTRIBUTION CLAIMS \ryERE
TIMELY ASSERTED.
DKC's Thirtl-Party Complaint brings a Fourth Cause of Action for contribution
and indemnity against the Subcontractors.TT DKC should be permitted to pursue its
indemnity and contribution claims against the Subcontractors because the Builders
Statute of Repose applies a different repose period for these claims.78
An "action" is defined in the Builders Statute of Repose as including all causes of
action, whether based in tort, contract, wartanty, strict liability, indemnity, contribution,
or other source of law. SeerJtah Code Ann. $ 788-2-225(1Xb) (emphasis added). The
repose period prescribed in Utah Code section 188-2-225(3Xa) is expressly limited to
actions based in contract or warranty whereas section 188-2-225(3Xb) applies to "all
other actions." Thus, the structure of the statute intentionally distinguishes causes of
action based in contract and warranty from claims based in tort, indemnity, strict liability,
tt R. 879-90.tt Altho.rgh DKC did not raise this issue in the District Court, this Court may review this
argument under the plain error doctrine. In order to apply plain error review, DKC must
establish that "(l) an error exists; (2) the error should have been obvious to the trial court;
and (3) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a
more favorable outcome." Meadow Valley Contractors., Inc. v. UDOT,2011 UT 35, 9[
80, 266 P.3d 611 (Durham, J., concurring). All of these elements are met here. An
obvious eror exists because dismissal of DKC's indemnity claims contravenes the plain
language of the Statute of Repose. See State v. Alzaga,2015 UT App 133, 1123,352P.3d
107. This error was hannful because absent the error, DKC would still have claims and
remedies against the Subcontractors.
') ')
and contribution. Any interpretation treating indemnity and contribution claims as being
subsumed within the category of warranty or contract would necessarily nullify other
statutory provisions treating them separately, and would therefore, be improper. See
Rapela v. Green,2012UT 57 ,ïÍ 19,289 P.3d 428 (noting that courts must construe
statutes "such that no part or provision will be inoperative or superfluous, void or
insignificant, and so that one section will not destroy another").
Utah courts presume that the Legislature used each term advisedly and give effect
to each term according to its ordinary and accepted meanin g. Versluis v. Guaranty Nat'l
Cos.,842P.2d 865,867 (Utah 1992). By limiting the causes of action falling within the
purview of Utah Code section 18B'2-225(3Xa) to contract and warranty claims, the
Legislature clearly intended that contribution and indemnity claims (among others) be
subject to section 788-2-225(3Xb). Consequently, instead of the six year repose period
commencing upon the substantial completion of the Home being applicable, DKC's
indemnity and contribution claims are subject to the two year period commencing upon
"the date of discovery of a cause of action or the date upon which a cause of action
should have been discovered." IJtah Code Ann. * 788-2-225(3Xb).
DKC brought its claims for indemnity and contribution within two years of being
served with Plaintiff's suit seeking monetary damages from DKC. Plaintiff filed his
Cgmplaint on July 30,2010,7e and DKC filed its Third-Party Complaint on April 20,
tnR. 
1
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2012. As such, DKC's claims against the Subcontractors were timely asserted and the
District Courl's ruling should be reversed in this regard.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, DKC respectfully requests that this Court AFFIRM the
District Court's dismissal of Plaintiff's claims against DKC and REVERSE the District
Court's grant of summary judgment to Third-Party Defendants Superior Insulation, Akita
Construction, and Picture Perfect Stone Masonry.
DATED this 19th day of January, 2016.
PLLC
Jesse C. Trentadue
Noah M. Hoagland
Attorney s for D efendant, Third- P arty
P laintiff, and App e ll e e/ C r o s s - Ap p e llant
Douglas Knight Construction, Inc.
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sent U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, to the following parties:
Kumen L. Taylor, Esq.
Richard L. Wade, Esq.
HUTCHISoN & STEFFEN, LLC
Peccole Professional Park
10080 Alta Drive, Suite 200
Las Vegas, NV 89145
Attorneys 
.for Akita Construction, Inc.
Joseph E. Wrona, Esq.
Bastiaan K. Coebergh, Esq
Jarom B. Bangerter, Esq.
WRoNa L¡,w FnV, P.C.
1745 Sidewinder Drive
Park city, utah 84060
Attorneys for Plointiff
Brett N. Anderson, Esq.
Scott R. Taylor, Esq.
BLACKBURN & SToLL, LC
251F,ast 200 South, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Superior Insulation Co., Inc.
Scott T. Evans, Esq.
Gabriel K. White, Esq.
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN
15 V/est South Temple, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Picture Perfect Stone
Masonry,, I LC
U.S. Mail only to:
U.S Deck, Inc.
c/o Thomas Paul Zick, President
1834 Ash Court
Fr6cis, urah 84036
U.S. Mail only to:
Signature Concrete, Inc.
c/o James C. Conway, President
5637 South 700'West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123
3t
ADDENDUM
Addendum 1 - Determinative Law
Addendum 2 - Construction Agreement
Addendum 3 - June 3,2015 Order
Addendum 4 - Jantary 29, 2015 Order
Addendum 5 - August 26,2014 Order and January 2,2015 Order
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